The European Union’s reported decision to remove Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman from its Russia sanctions blacklist has turned a routine renewal into a test of the bloc’s political credibility. The immediate issue is the status of two prominent businessmen long associated, in different ways, with Russia’s economic and political system. The larger one is whether a foreign-policy instrument meant to demonstrate European unity can be reshaped in private negotiations around the particular interests of individual capitals.
\nThe compromise is said to have secured a three-year extension for sanctions covering roughly 3,000 remaining targets. But if that outcome depended on removing Usmanov and Fridman, it would reveal the price of unanimity: a system in which any member state can delay collective action and seek concessions that may have little to do with the central policy objective.
\nEU sanctions are not self-executing. Their continuation, amendment and renewal depend on agreement among member states in the Council of the European Union. That structure gives the bloc’s measures broad reach when consensus exists.
\nIt also creates a recurring point of leverage whenever sanctions return for review. In this case, France and Luxembourg are reported to have played important roles in the final bargaining. Their involvement has raised questions about whether arguments over particular listings became connected to separate diplomatic priorities, including France’s effort to secure the release of a prisoner in Azerbaijan.
\nThere is, as yet, no public account of the full terms of any bargain. That absence is central to the controversy. Sanctions policy is often presented as a rules-based response to aggression and threats to European security.
\nIf exceptions emerge from confidential political trades, critics will ask whether the system is being administered according to evidence and legal criteria, or according to the negotiating strength of national governments at a particular moment. The distinction matters beyond the two men concerned. A listing can impose severe restrictions, including EU-wide asset freezes and limits on making funds or economic resources available to a designated person.
\nDelisting, conversely, carries legal, financial and symbolic consequences. It may affect access to assets, commercial relationships and the broader perception of the EU’s resolve.
\nUsmanov and Fridman have each pursued legal and political avenues to challenge or contest sanctions. Such challenges are part of the EU’s legal order: restrictive measures must be capable of justification and are subject to scrutiny. The question is not whether designated individuals should have procedural rights.
\nThey should. The question is whether the Council can clearly separate legal assessment from political bargaining. A decision to retain, alter or remove a listing should rest on the applicable evidentiary standard and the stated grounds for designation.
\nIf member states instead trade support across unrelated files, the legal discipline around sanctions risks being weakened. That risk is heightened by unanimity. In a union of governments with different economic exposures, diplomatic priorities and domestic political pressures, a single capital can turn a collective decision into a negotiation over side payments, concessions or bilateral objectives.
\nFrance’s reported interest in a prisoner release from Azerbaijan illustrates the potential overlap of agendas. Securing the release of an individual may be a legitimate diplomatic objective. Yet linking that objective, directly or indirectly, to a decision on Russia sanctions would invite scrutiny over whether Europe’s response to Russia’s war against Ukraine is becoming currency for unrelated diplomacy.
\nLuxembourg’s role likewise requires close examination, given its importance as a European financial centre and the practical significance of sanctions enforcement for financial institutions and asset holders. Its government should set out whether it advocated the removal of particular names, on what grounds, and whether it sought or obtained any wider policy concessions.
\nThe episode also renews attention on national sanctions tools. Latvia and other member states have explored ways to apply restrictive measures at national level, potentially offering a means of maintaining pressure when EU consensus falters. Such measures, however, are not a simple substitute for EU listings.
\nNational regimes may have narrower reach, different legal foundations and less effect across the single market. An EU-wide asset freeze carries a scale and coherence that national action cannot automatically replicate. Still, the prospect of unilateral action reflects growing concern among states that regard sanctions as integral to European security.
\nIf they believe the Council process is vulnerable to bargaining over individual delistings, they may seek domestic mechanisms to preserve pressure on figures they consider significant. Ukraine’s response will be closely watched, as will reactions from members of the European Parliament. Both are likely to focus on whether the decision signals a temporary compromise during the 2026 renewal cycle or a broader shift in enforcement.
\nFor the EU, that is the central question. A sanctions regime can be legally exacting and politically consequential at the same time. But its authority depends on the confidence that decisions about whom to list — and whom to remove — are governed by stated criteria rather than the private bargains made necessary by unanimity.
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